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American wars have had a considerable toll on the
civilian populations of the countries they have been waged in.
The best estimate of civilian deaths directly caused by coalition
forces in The Iraq War is 11,516, which is three times higher
than the deaths of coalition forces and accounts for 33% of
Iraqi deaths in the war.48 The American public, however, is not
particularly concerned by these casualties. American casualties
play a far larger role in determining public support for wars,
despite the fact that these are often much lower than civilian
casualties (as seen in the figures above).49
Such partiality is to be expected, but the indifference
to civilian casualties should be meliorated for two reasons.
Concern for civilian casualties is good from a moral-epistemic
standpoint, insofar as these casualties are morally concerning.
Many of these wars are partly justified by the aim of improving
these civilians’ lives, hence their deaths at the hands of
US forces are deeply unjust. I cannot explore this complex
question further, so I will assume that more concern for civilian
casualties than the indifference currently displayed is a moralepistemic improvement. These moral-epistemic improvements
can in turn lead to political improvements. The public becoming
more aware that civilian casualties are morally troubling might
lead to greater public outcry about them, which might in turn
lead to changes in foreign policy and military strategy that
reduce civilian casualties.
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In this essay, I will explore the nature of Americans’
insensitivity and propose strategies for meliorating it. I will
argue that the epistemic structures it is rooted in and the fact
that Americans are not aware that they are insensitive mean
that certain strategies are particularly effective in combatting
Americans’ insensitivity. In the first section, I will outline the
social-epistemological terms that will be applied to Americans’
insensitivity - meta-blindness, meta-attitudes, and social
imaginaries. Meta-blindness is José Medina’s term for the
phenomenon whereby insensitive subjects are unaware that
they are insensitive.50 In the second section, I will apply these
concepts to international relations scholar John Tirman’s
analysis of Americans’ insensitivity to civilian casualties. I will
argue that two causes Tirman identifies, orientalism and the
frontier myth, are dominant social imaginaries. Another cause,
orientalist knowledge hierarchies, are meta-attitudes. I will
argue that this implies that American citizens are blind to their
insensitivity, something Tirman doesn’t identify.
In the third section, I will outline the implications of
this analysis for how insensitivity to civilian casualties must
be combatted. I will argue that combatting this insensitivity
requires something beyond pointing out that certain attitudes
are insensitive or presenting sensitive attitudes. Specifically,
it requires targeting meta-blindness and the background
epistemic structures of orientalism and the frontier myth. I
will argue that since these background epistemic structures are
dominant social imaginaries and meta-attitudes, they should be
challenged from different imaginaries and meta-attitudes that
Americans can access. Meta-blindness should be combatted by
engendering the comparison of different epistemic perspectives.

1. Meta-Blindness, Meta-Attitudes, and Social Imaginaries
This section will outline the paper’s governing socialepistemological framework. I will first outline the sense in
which emotions are epistemic attitudes. I will then explain what
Medina means by the term meta-blindness, and set out what
will be meant by the terms “insensitivity”, “concern”, and their
antonyms throughout the paper. Finally, I will outline what
meta-attitudes and social imaginaries are.
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Because Americans have both beliefs and emotions
about civilian casualties, it is important to clarify the epistemic
significance of emotions. I cannot treat these issues in detail,
but will briefly justify the claim that emotions are epistemic
attitudes because they serve as reasons for belief. I will
assume that the perception theory of emotions (which I will
outline shortly) is correct. It is an example of a theory which
sees emotions as involving what D’Arms and Jacobson call
“evaluative presentations” of their objects, and theories of
this kind are currently the majority view in the philosophy of
emotion.51 Analogous arguments to those made in this paper
could be made assuming any other evaluative presentation
theory. 52
Christine Tappolet claims that emotions are perceptual
experiences of an evaluative property, such as fearsomeness or
admirability, in their object.53 If I fear a plant then I perceptually
experience fearsomeness in it. Such perceptions can be fitting
or unfitting depending on whether the object possesses the
property in question.54 Fear of a lion is fitting, while fear of
a sunflower is not. Perceptual experiences do not undertake
epistemic commitments – I can perceptually experience a plant
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as fearsome and yet know that it is not fearsome. Emotions can
nonetheless be seen as epistemic attitudes on the perception
theory in the broad sense of attitudes that are relevant to
epistemic commitments. Tappolet claims that emotions are
reasons for beliefs in the same way visual experiences are: if we
perceive fearsomeness in something, this is a prima facie reason
to believe that it is fearsome.55 This means that emotions are
relevant to knowledge and are thus epistemic attitudes in the
broad sense. Moreover, fittingness is an epistemic norm – fitting
emotions are reasons for correct beliefs, and unfitting emotions
are reasons for incorrect beliefs.
Fitting emotions about civilian casualties, on this view,
lead Americans to correct beliefs and thus have the same moralepistemic and political benefits as correct beliefs. Outrage
about a civilian casualty gives Americans a prima facie reason to
believe that the casualty is outrageous. Outrage about civilian
casualties should therefore be cultivated insofar as civilian
casualties are outrageous, and insofar as believing a casualty
to be outrageous can lead subjects to other correct beliefs, such
as “the casualty was a terrible injustice”. Similarly, unfitting
emotions like joy are prima facie reasons to form incorrect beliefs
like the belief that a casualty is joyous, and so there are benefits
to cultivating more fitting emotions. While the reason joy gives
is firmly overruled by basic moral considerations of the value of
human life, such considerations may not sway certain people,
and replacing joy with a more fitting emotion might bring them
to have correct beliefs. This indicates that emotions and beliefs
have similar importance for my question, and I will speak of
them concurrently as epistemic attitudes.56, 57
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I will count absences of emotion as emotions. Thus,
if a civilian casualty is outrageous and someone is apathetic
in the face of it, their emotion is unfitting insofar as they are
not perceiving the property of outrageousness. This is not a
theoretical claim, for I do not think that absences of emotion
are emotions, particularly assuming a perception theory on
which emotions must perceive properties. It is rather a matter of
convenience, insofar as not having a fitting emotion can inhibit
people from acquiring correct beliefs about casualties in the
same way that having an unfitting emotion “proper” like joy
can. While the latter has more potential for distortion insofar as
it gives an active reason to form an incorrect belief, some people
might not consider casualties outrageous unless they have the
prima facie reason outrage gives them. For such people, having
no emotion can inhibit them from reaching correct beliefs
insofar as it inhibits them from feeling outrage, and in this sense
their absences of emotion are “unfitting emotions”.
Medina defines meta-blindness as a subject’s epistemic
blindness with respect to their first-order epistemic attitudes.58
First-order epistemic attitudes are about something that is not
an epistemic attitude – for example, the belief that the earth is
round. Second-order epistemic attitudes are about a subject’s
own first-order epistemic attitudes – for example, A’s belief
that A’s belief that the earth is round is correct. Meta-blindness
always involves first-order epistemic attitudes about features of
one’s social world, and second-order epistemic attitudes which
are incorrect attitudes towards those first-order attitudes.59
One could have first-order attitudes of incorrect beliefs about
others (such as not knowing the difference between Shia and
Sunni Islam), and a second-order attitude which is an incorrect
belief about one’s first-order beliefs (such as thinking that one’s
beliefs cover every part of the social world). The first-order
attitude could also be affective, such as a lack of concern for
the suffering of Muslims.60 Meta-blindness would here lie in an
incorrect second-order belief about this lack of concern, such
paper, would undoubtedly be of interest.
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as thinking that one is not wrong for lacking concern because
the situation does not warrant concern. While the second-order
attitudes could be affective (feeling concerned or unconcerned
about one’s first-order attitudes), only cognitive second-order
attitudes are required for my analysis.61
First-order blindness refers to first-order epistemic
attitudes that are incorrect beliefs or unfitting emotions. I will,
following Medina, refer to both of these as “insensitivities”,
because it best captures the epistemic attitudes that are
the focus of my paper.62 I will also refer to them as “firstorder insensitivities”, even though I do not use the term
“second-order insensitivity”, in order to distinguish them
from meta-blindness. Insensitivities could be cognitive,
such as thinking a civilian casualty isn’t morally wrong, or
affective, such as not feeling outrage at a needless casualty.
Conversely, “sensitivities’ are correct beliefs or fitting emotions.
Correctness and fittingness of beliefs and emotions come
on a scale, so sometimes I will speak of attitudes as more or
less sensitive than one another, rather than as “sensitivities”
and “insensitivities”. Beliefs and emotions about civilian
casualties can be concerned – such as the belief that a casualty
is unjust and outrage at a needless casualty –- or unconcerned.
“Concern” and “unconcern” do not determine whether an
attitude is correct or fitting – a concerned or unconcerned
attitude could, depending on how the world is, be an
insensitivity or a sensitivity. I have, however, assumed that the
world is such that Americans coming to have more concern
about civilian casualties is a moral-epistemic improvement.
Medina defines “meta-attitudes” as epistemic attitudes
about one’s epistemic attitudes.63 Meta-attitudes could take
many shapes, such as attitudes about one’s epistemic abilities.64
For example, epistemic arrogance places undue credence in
one’s beliefs, and an undue lack of credence in contradictory
beliefs.65 Meta-attitudes influence epistemic life in several
ways. For example, they determine which attitudes one takes
seriously, and which are dismissed without consideration.66
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For example, epistemic arrogance leads people to dismiss
anything which conflicts with their current attitudes.67 Metaattitudes also influence epistemic life by determining which
epistemic attitudes a subject seeks out, and what subjects count
as justification.68 Meta-attitudes can be beneficial as well as
harmful – e- empiricism is a beneficial meta-attitude that places
higher credence in attitudes for which there is evidence.
Moira Gatens defines the social imaginary as the
“background” of “imaginings” by which individuals in a
society can understand one another, with these imaginings
including things like images and scripts.69 The social imaginary
consists of many different imaginaries, some of which are
dominant imaginaries such as the patriarchal imaginary and
the white imaginary.70 When something falls outside dominant
social imaginaries, it is “unimaginable” from within them.71
Medina analyses how in To Kill a Mockingbird, “black pity
for white subjects” and “a white girl coming on to” a black
man are shown to be unimaginable within the dominant
white imaginary of Jim Crow Alabama. Instead, the script of
this imaginary read that black people “have a sexual agency
out of control whereas white women lack sexual agency”.72
Imaginaries can also influence affective life, for example by
rendering one unable to experience sympathy for people who
are dehumanised by the imaginary’s scripts.73
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Subjects’ beliefs and emotions are not completely
determined by dominant social imaginaries, for there are what
Medina calls “alternative social imaginaries”.74 For example,
the black imaginary within Jim Crow Alabama challenged the
script of the white imaginary insofar as black people recognised
the incorrectness of the white imaginary’s racist stereotypes.75
People may come to inhabit different imaginaries, and thus be
able to imagine what was previously unimaginable to them.76
Nonetheless, since dominant imaginaries render many contents
of other imaginaries unintelligible, entering other imaginaries is
challenging for subjects under dominant imaginaries.77 Hereon,
I will use “epistemic structures” to refer to both imaginaries and
meta-attitudes.
2. The Insensitivity of American Citizens to Civilian
Casualties
Having outlined the concepts of meta-blindness, metaattitudes, and the social imaginary, I am now in a position to
analyse American citizens’ insensitivity to civilian casualties
in terms of this framework. After going over part of the
empirical evidence for Americans’ insensitivity, I will present
Tirman’s case for orientalism and the frontier myth causing this
insensitivity, noting that both are dominant social imaginaries.
I will then present Tirman’s case for orientalist knowledge
hierarchies causing insensitivity, noting that they are metaattitudes. Finally, I will argue that the influence of these
epistemic structures would cause Americans to be meta-blind.
The implications of this analysis for how insensitivity should be
combatted will be presented in the next section.
Tirman presents empirical evidence for Americans’
insensitivity to civilian casualties, although notes that there
is little survey data on this topic, which he claims is “itself a
symptom” of indifference.78 I will present Tirman’s evidence
for insensitivity to civilian casualties in the wars in Iraq, since
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these wars feature later in my paper. Analysing public polling,
Tirman claims that “American casualties and achievement of
war aims tend to be the key variables of popularity, not local
impact”, which reflects indifference towards civilian casualties.79
Tirman identifies that the public sphere also reflected
indifference: “few major politicians… expressed compassion for
the Iraqis’ suffering; no major religious figures came forward
with calls to help the victims of violence…; editorials about Iraq
in major newspapers rarely mentioned civilian casualties”.80
Tirman doesn’t specify which epistemic attitudes are reflected
in the public polling, but his description of the public sphere’s
reaction indicates that Americans’ insensitivity involves both
beliefs about the moral seriousness of civilian casualties and
emotions directed towards those casualties. Tirman gives
several causes of this insensitivity: government narratives,
psychological defence mechanisms, orientalism, and the frontier
myth.81 The latter two will be the focus of my analysis, because
they most clearly demonstrate why Americans are meta-blind.
Tirman identifies both orientalism and the frontier myth
as causes of American insensitivity, and while Tirman doesn’t
use this term, both are dominant imaginaries. Margaret Kohn
and Kavita Reddy define Edward Said’s concept of orientalism
as referring to “a structured set of concepts, assumptions, and
discursive practices” prevalent during colonial Europe “that
were used to produce, interpret, and evaluate knowledge
about non-European peoples”.82 These assumptions included
associating negative traits with non-European people, with
Said giving the example of seeing “the Arab” “as an oversexed
degenerate,… sadistic, treacherous, low.”83 Said also identifies
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that Arab people are not seen in their specificity as human
beings under orientalism: “The Arab is always shown in
large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics
or experiences”.84 Tirman identifies that these orientalist
assumptions have underlain American attitudes towards the
civilian populations of American wars, and have reinforced
insensitivity.85 These populations have often been Asian and
Arab populations who are subject to orientalist stereotypes.
Furthermore, Tirman notes that American empire has been
“based in part on a supposition of white superiority”, and that
the American military has notably used such racial slurs as
“gooks” and “hajis”.86 Orientalism is a social imaginary which
Americans inhabit, since it is based on representations of Asian
and Arab populations. Moreover, it is a dominant imaginary,
insofar as non-orientalist imaginaries are less accessible to
Americans than orientalist imaginaries.
This imaginary engenders insensitivity. In their research
on Israeli citizens’ reactions to Palestinian civilians dying at the
hands of Israeli forces, social psychologist Noa Schori-Eyal and
collaborators found that viewing civilians harmed in war in
dehumanising ways leads to perceiving them as less common
with oneself.87 This, in turn, makes one more likely to tolerate
harms to those civilians.88 Americans influenced by orientalism
see civilians in derogatory and dehumanising ways, and are
therefore less likely to form concerned attitudes about civilian
casualties.
Tirman defines the frontier myth as a “set of ideas,
myths, and self-identities” in which America is seen as having
a “mission” of “taming… the wilderness” and the “savages”
who live there.89 The earliest example of this in the public
conscience is the violence European-American colonisers
committed against Indigenous peoples, and Tirman claims

84

345;

85
86
87

Said, Orientalism, 278-9, quoted in Tirman, The Deaths of Others,

Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 344
Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 236, 344.
Noa Schori-Eyal, Eran Halperin, and Tamar Saguy, “Intergroup
Commonality, Political Ideology, and Tolerance of Enemy Collateral
Casualties in Intergroup Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 3
(2019): 434.
88
Schori-Eyal, Halperin, and Saguy, “Intergroup Commonality,” 434.
89
Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 350-351
70

EPISTEME XXXII

that the myth has underlain American global expansion.90 He
identifies a particular conception of violence as central to this
myth. Firstly, the violence is seen as “defensive” or “reactive”,
responding to provocation from external forces (for example, to
provocation from “Indian savagery”).91 Secondly, the violence
is seen as “regenerative”, as reaffirming the “moral worth of
its practitioner.” In the modern context, this takes the form
of reaffirming “the natural rightness of Anglo-Saxon liberty”,
among other things.92
This is a dominant imaginary, and Tirman claims
that it underlies American responses to civilian casualties
and engenders insensitivity. While Tirman doesn’t label it as
an imaginary, he notes it is deeply rooted in the American
psyche and “powerfully shapes the attitudes and behaviour of
Americans from childhood.”93 This imaginary structures how
Americans see wars and the civilians in them, since American
wars are often framed under the lenses of defensive and
regenerative violence (for example, The Iraq War was seen as
regeneration after “a period of softness” which had resulted, in
this imaginary, in 9/11).94 This way of seeing wars engenders
insensitivity. Tirman identifies that it creates a script on which
civilians are not the focus, being rather “players in this drama”
which is truly about America’s moral redemption.95 Americans’
reactions to civilian casualties are determined by this script,
which stifles concern insofar as it accords no harm to civilians,
or frames harms that do occur as justified insofar as they are
defensive and regenerative.96
Tirman claims that another side of orientalism fosters
insensitivity, namely hierarchies of knowledge which mediate
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the way in which people in “The Orient” are understood.97
These knowledge hierarchies are meta-attitudes. American
orientalist knowledge hierarchies unduly privilege the
American social sciences, such as historiography and
international relations. These disciplines are thought to lead
to “knowledge” of other cultures, while voices from those
cultures “are not heard”, and “are discounted as… ignorant”
on the rare occasions when they are heard (Tirman cites the
US public’s reaction to the polls of Iraqi civilians).98 Such
knowledge hierarchies constitute a meta-attitude about
what counts as “knowledge” of these civilians, namely that
“knowledge” of them does not come from their mouths, hearts,
and bodies, but from American expertise. Tirman claims that
these knowledge hierarchies engender American insensitivity
because they makes it such that the American public “knows”,
with “scientific veracity”, that foreign populations have traits
which justify violence (for example, having “no appreciation
for freedom”).99 This makes Americans see their unconcerned
attitudes towards civilian casualties, that are in fact insensitive,
as justified.
The preceding analyses indicate that American citizens
are meta-blind because these citizens have epistemic structures
which block epistemic counterpoints, and can avail themselves
of several justifications for their cognitively and affectively
insensitive attitudes.100 Medina calls epistemic attitudes
that conflict with one’s own “epistemic counterpoints”.101
The imaginaries of orientalism and the frontier myth
inhibit Americans from experiencing such counterpoints by
rendering concerned attitudes towards civilian casualties
unimaginable. This unimaginability inhibits Americans from
coming to concerned attitudes themselves, which might act as
counterpoints to their other epistemic attitudes. For example,
perhaps without the imaginary of orientalism an American
might feel sympathy for the family of a civilian casualty, which

97
While this could be analysed as part of the social imaginary of
orientalism, I prefer to analyse the imaginary as involving imaginings, and I
do not see knowledge ascription as an imagining.
98
Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 345-346.
99
Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 346-347
100
Medina gives arguments for why imaginaries and meta-attitudes
generally cause meta-blindness, which I have drawn on for my specific
claims here (Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 82, 149, 306).
101
Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 70, 75.
72

EPISTEME XXXII

would challenge their belief that “that killing was, on balance,
justified.” The unimaginability of sensitive attitudes can also
distort Americans’ interpretations of epistemic counterpoints
that others articulate. Imagine someone expresses the belief that
a civilian casualty was unjust. Such concern is incompatible
with the orientalist imaginary, so it might be distorted for
someone living under that imaginary – they might see it as a
mere expression of the speaker’s sadness about their day, rather
than a claim about the world. Thus, the imaginaries preclude
Americans from experiencing concerned attitudes (whether
held by themselves or others) which would challenge their
insensitivity. This makes them unable to acknowledge that their
beliefs and emotions are insensitive, rendering them metablind.
Even if Americans did experience epistemic
counterpoints, however, their imaginaries and meta-attitudes
would diminish the counterpoints’ ability to make them
aware of their limitations. This is because these structures
distort Americans’ judgments of which attitudes are sensitive
and which insensitive. I have argued that knowledge
hierarchies engender first-order insensitivity by justifying
unconcerned attitudes, but this justification also entrenches
meta-blindness by making Americans see their insensitive
attitudes as sensitive.102 According to these meta-attitudes,
unconcerned attitudes are correct or fitting since they accord
with American “expertise” and are not blinded by “inferior”
forms of knowledge. The imaginaries similarly justify
unconcerned attitudes. The frontier myth renders unconcerned
beliefs and emotions about civilian casualties sensitive, since
they correctly respond to the properties of American moral
regeneration, and are not blinded by considerations irrelevant
to the expansion of the frontier. Deep concern is an insensitive
attitude towards civilian casualties according to the orientalist
imaginary, on which civilians are unworthy of respect and
lack the individuality which might give special value to their
lives. According to this imaginary, callous attitudes, rather
than concerned ones, correctly perceive the properties of
civilian casualties. Thus, these imaginaries and meta-attitudes
make Americans see their unconcerned attitudes, which are
insensitive, as sensitive. These are incorrect attitudes towards
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their beliefs and emotions about civilian casualties, and thus
constitute meta-blindness.
3. Combatting Insensitivity
I have claimed that American citizens are meta-blind
with respect to their insensitivity to civilian casualties, and that
this meta-blindness is rooted in the dominant imaginaries of
orientalism and the frontier myth, as well as the meta-attitudes
of orientalist knowledge hierarchies. I will now show how
this analysis suggests ways in which insensitivity should be
combatted. I will first outline two seemingly intuitive strategies
for combatting insensitivity, which do not target meta-blindness
or background epistemic structures: highlighting insensitivity
and presenting sensitive attitudes. I will then argue that
such strategies are inadequate, and background epistemic
structures and meta-blindness must be directly targeted. I will
suggest strategies that directly target each of these. Epistemic
structures can be challenged by utilising different imaginaries
and meta-attitudes, while meta-blindness can be challenged by
engendering comparison of different epistemic perspectives.
I will give concrete examples of these strategies from the
MoMA’s exhibition “Theater of Operations: The Gulf Wars
1991-2011”.103
An intuitive way of combatting American insensitivity
focuses on first-order insensitive attitudes without regard to
their background epistemic structures or Americans’ metablindness. Two strategies which do this are highlighting
insensitivity and presenting sensitive attitudes. Imagine that
someone expresses a callous attitude towards a civilian casualty
like “their life wasn’t worth much”. Highlighting insensitivity
involves telling the speaker that what they said was insensitive,
for example by saying “that’s quite callous of you”. Presenting
a sensitive attitude involves exhibiting a concerned attitude
towards the casualties, for example saying “that attack was
horrific”.

103

I have not seen this exhibition in person, and my knowledge of it
is from the following sources: “Theater of Operations: The Gulf Wars 19912011,” MoMA, accessed June 10, 2020, https://www.moma.org/calendar/
exhibitions/5084; Tim Arango and Jason Farago, “These Artists Refuse
to Forget the Wars in Iraq,” New York Times, November 14, 2019; Neil
MacFarquhar, “Mourning Iraq’s Destruction, a Native Son Creates,” New
York Times, December 31, 2019; Eleni Zaras, “New York City’s MoMA PS1
“Gulf Wars” Exhibition Caught in Crossfire,” The Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs 39, no. 3 (2020): 48-50.
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These methods, while effective to some extent, are
insufficient as a complete strategy for combatting American
insensitivity, since forms of insensitivity may remain in
the face of such challenges unless epistemic structures and
meta-blindness are directly targeted. If Americans’ epistemic
structures are not targeted, the challenges identified above
will often be unimaginable or unjustified to them. As
previously identified, Americans often interpret sensitive
attitudes incorrectly due to the imaginaries’ distortions.
Even if sensitive attitudes can be correctly interpreted, they
might be written off as insensitive since meta-attitudes and
imaginaries distort judgments of sensitivity and insensitivity.
Similarly, highlighting insensitivity might be ineffective, as
the insensitive subject might think that their attitude is not
insensitive – they’re not callous, they’re having a clear-thinking
reaction to a justified killing. Because of these ways in which
insensitivities can remain in the face of first-order challenges to
insensitivity, orientalism and the frontier myth must be directly
targeted. Because I analysed them as imaginaries and metaattitudes, I can avail myself of Medina’s strategy for combatting
such epistemic structures. This is the strategy of challenging
epistemic structures from different epistemic structures that
Americans may access.
Recall that subjects in dominant imaginaries are
not wholly stuck there, but can enter different imaginaries.
Alternative social imaginaries can challenge the dominant
one.104 For example, perhaps certain American citizens can
enter a pacifist imaginary and see the world through its
lens. This might lead them to outrage at civilian casualties.
Nonetheless, alternative imaginaries might be inaccessible to
one who is stuck within a dominant imaginary that renders
the contents of alternative imaginaries unimaginable or
unjustified. The frontier myth renders it unimaginable that
peace could be sustained, because that would end the frontier
myth.105 Therefore, subjects who inhabit the frontier myth
might be unable to inhabit a pacifist imaginary. This means that
resistance from within a different dominant imaginary could be
necessary.106 For example, Dia al-Azzawi’s painting “Mission of
Destruction” directly challenges the frontier myth by drawing
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Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 257
Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 366.
Medina “Racial violence”, 32-33.
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on Picasso’s “Guernica” (American troops are on the right,
Iraqis on the left):107

Dia al-Azzawi, “Mission of Destruction”
“Guernica” is not a dominant imaginary in American
society as a whole, but it is in the context of a modern art
gallery. This painting uses this imaginary to frame American
troops not as saviours or as engaging in regenerative violence,
but as engaging in violence equivalent to the horrifying
violence of “Guernica”. This uses a different dominant
imaginary which people in the art gallery inhabit (“Guernica”)
to challenge the frontier myth.
Similar strategies can be used to challenge metaattitudes. Challenges can come from meta-attitudes the subject
doesn’t currently possess, but can come to possess, such as
meta-attitudes which privilege local knowledge over American
“expertise”. Alternatively, challenges can come from a different
meta-attitude the subject currently possesses, for example using
the meta-attitude of empiricism to challenge the meta-attitude
of privileging American expertise, as this expertise gets things
empirically wrong (for example, being wrong about what
will be politically stabilising). Thus, combatting Americans’
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MacFarquhar, “Mourning Iraq’s Destruction.”
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insensitivity requires directly targeting background epistemic
structures, and my analysis of their insensitivity suggests
doing this by challenging Americans’ epistemic structures from
different epistemic structures they can access.
Combatting insensitivity to civilian casualties also
requires targeting meta-blindness directly. Combatting
meta-blindness involves creating an awareness of first-order
insensitivities.108 For Americans, this would be an awareness
of their inability to have certain beliefs about and affective
attitudes towards civilian casualties. In order to ensure that
Americans overcome insensitivities in new contexts that
generate new insensitivities, Americans must be vigilant about
checking their epistemic limitations and seeking out alternative
perspectives that might correct those limitations. These
habits can be fostered by combatting meta-blindness to make
them aware that they have limitations. It might be that some
level of awareness of limitations is achieved by highlighting
insensitivities and presenting sensitivities, since one might
become humbler upon being corrected. This is by no means
guaranteed, however. We should therefore consider strategies
which try to directly combat meta-blindness.
The strategy Medina proposes for combatting metablindness is encouraging people to compare different epistemic
perspectives with their own.109 Through a comparison of
sensitive and insensitive perspectives on civilian casualties,
insensitive subjects can become more aware of their epistemic
limitations. If an American compares their perspective on
civilian casualties with an Iraqi’s, the more concerned attitudes
in the latter than in the former are highlighted. The American
might thereby realise that such concern is sensitive, and their
absence of concern is insensitive.110 “Theater of Operations”
encourages its audience to engage in such comparison. It
contains works by both Western and non-Western artists,
including artists from Iraq and Kuwait, allowing comparison
not merely between cognitive perspectives, but affective ones as
well, insofar as these perspectives are expressed in emotionally
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Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 186-190.
Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 199-201.
I acknowledge that this strategy is limited insofar as many of
the perspectives presented for comparison with the American one will
be distorted or rendered insensitive by Americans’ background epistemic
structures. The two strategies I have proposed in this section should therefore
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charged artworks.111 For example, many works focus on media
representations of the Gulf War. Michel Auder’s “Gulf War TV
War” plays footage from contemporary news broadcasts.112

Michel Auder, “Gulf War TV War”
These images depict the war as, in Tim Arango’s words,
“a sanitized… war without a lot of casualties”.113 They convey
the dominant epistemic perspective, and it is insensitive to
civilian casualties. The work also conveys Auder’s perspective,
which criticises the dominant perspective without showing
what that perspective misses. Yet the exhibition also contains
works from Iraqi artists which present sensitive attitudes that
the dominant perspective misses. Hanaa Malallah’s “She/He
Has No Picture” is a series of portraits of the victims of a US
bomb strike that killed 400 people in the Amiriyah shelter.114
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Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget,” and Zaras,
“Exhibition Caught in Crossfire,” 48-50 mention this comparison of
perspectives.
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Hanaa Malallah, “She/He Has No Picture”
The texture of these paintings is disrupted, making
it seem like they are disintegrating. This disintegration is
juxtaposed with the often lively, smiling faces, conveying a
great sense of loss.115 Mallalah’s works mourns these casualties,
and this is a sensitive attitude towards them. Considered alone,
Auder’s work and Malallah’s highlight an insensitivity and
present a sensitivity, respectively. The exhibition as a whole,
however, allows for direct comparison of Malallah’s sensitive
perspective with the perspective of the American media,
promoting awareness of the absence of concern in the latter
perspective. Viewers can also compare it with Auder’s critical
perspective, seeing that Auder does not perceive what is missed
by the dominant perspective and acknowledging this as a blind
spot in Auder’s perspective.
4. Conclusion
American citizens are meta-blind with respect to
their insensitivity to civilian casualties: they do not know
that they are insensitive. Their insensitivity is rooted in the
dominant social imaginaries of orientalism and the frontier
myth, as well as in the meta-attitude of orientalist knowledge
hierarchies. This means Americans are likely meta-blind, since
these epistemic structures prevent them from engaging with
epistemic counterpoints that would make them aware that they

115
This analysis is inspired by John Farago’s in Arango and Farago,
“These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
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are insensitive, and distort their judgments of which attitudes
are sensitive and which insensitive.
Identifying the role of imaginaries, meta-attitudes, and
meta-blindness in American insensitivity has implications for
how insensitivity should be combatted. Effectively combatting
insensitivity requires directly targeting Americans’ metablindness and their background epistemic structures. I thus
suggest two strategies for combatting insensitivity –- comparing
differing epistemic perspectives to combat meta-blindness,
and using different epistemic structures Americans can access
to challenge the epistemic structures of orientalism and the
frontier myth.
I have provided a novel analysis of Americans’
insensitivity to civilian casualties, and suggested novel ways
for combatting this insensitivity. The effectiveness of various
strategies is not settled by the arguments I have presented, and
interdisciplinary empirical work needs to be done to determine
which strategies are the most effective. Finding the best strategy
possible is necessary for producing the moral-epistemic
and political benefits of combatting insensitivity to civilian
casualties.
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